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ABSTRACT
Recent work on interpretability in machine learning and AI has
focused on the building of simplified models that approximate the
true criteria used to make decisions. These models are a useful
pedagogical device for teaching trained professionals how to pre-
dict what decisions will be made by the complex system, and most
importantly how the system might break. However, when consid-
ering any such model it’s important to remember Box’s maxim
that "All models are wrong but some are useful." We focus on the
distinction between these models and explanations in philosophy
and sociology. These models can be understood as a "do it yourself
kit" for explanations, allowing a practitioner to directly answer
"what if questions" or generate contrastive explanations without
external assistance. Although a valuable ability, giving these models
as explanations appears more difficult than necessary, and other
forms of explanation may not have the same trade-offs. We contrast
the different schools of thought on what makes an explanation,
and suggest that machine learning might benefit from viewing the
problem more broadly.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As we deploy automated decision-making systems in the real world,
questions of accountability become increasingly important.1 For
system builders questions such as “Is the system working as in-
tended?”, “Do the decisions being made seem sensible?” or “Are we
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conforming to equality regulation and legislation?” are important,
while a subject of the decision-making algorithm may be more
concerned with topics such as “Am I being treated fairly?” or “What
could I do differently to get a favourable outcome next time?”
These issues are not unique to computerised decision-making
systems, but with the growth of machine learning based systems
they have become even more important (Bodo et al., 2017; Kroll
et al., 2016; Nissenbaum, 1996; Olhede and Wolfe, 2018; Pasquale,
2015; Selbst and Barocas, 2018; Veale and Edwards, 2018). What
distinguishes machine learning is its use of arbitrary black-box
functions to make decisions. These black-box functions may be
extremely complex and have an internal state composed of millions
of interdependent values. As such, the functions used to make
decisions may well be too complex for humans to comprehend; and
it may not be possible to completely understand the full decision-
making criteria or rationale.
Under these constraints, it becomes an open question as to what
forms of explanation are even possible that can answer the earlier
questions. As such, one of the most striking aspects of research into
explainable AI (xAI) is how many different people, be they lawyers,
regulators, machine learning specialists, philosophers, or futurolo-
gists, are all prepared to agree on the importance of explainable AI.
However, very few stop to check what they are agreeing to, and to
find out what explainable AI means to other people involved in the
discussion (Lipton, 2016).
This gap of expectations is largest between machine learning,
which has essentially re-purposed the term “explanation,” and the
fields of law, cognitive science, philosophy and the social sciences
(which we refer to here collectively as the ‘explanation sciences’),
where it has a relatively well-defined technical meaning and a
plethora of research on types of explanations, their purposes, and
their social and cognitive function.2 Work on xAI currently occupies
only one or two small branches of this diverse research landscape.
Specifically, the vast majority of work in xAI produces simplified
approximations of complex decision-making functions. We argue
that these approximations function more like scientific models than
the types of scientific and ‘everyday’ explanations considered in
philosophy, cognitive science, and psychology.
In this paper we examine the extent of this gap between xAI and
the ‘explanation sciences’. We do so by first reviewing methods
for producing explanations in xAI, and explain how they are gen-
erally more akin to scientific modelling than explanation giving.
If this comparison holds, it follows that the majority of currently
available methods will, at best, produce locally reliable but globally
2The dichotomy between explanations in machine learning and elsewhere is well
illustrated by the recent work by Miller et al. (2017) who found that none of the
papers on a curated reading list for xAI made use of work from the social sciences on
explanations.
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misleading explanations of model functionality. We then exam-
ine research on explanations in philosophy, cognitive science, and
the social sciences which suggests that ‘why-questions’ (e.g. ‘why
did the model exhibit that behaviour?’) require explanations that
are contrastive, selective, and socially interactive. On this basis,
we argue that, if xAI is to produce methods that make algorith-
mic decision-making systems more trustworthy and accountable,
the field’s attention must shift to the development of interactive
methods for post-hoc interpretability that make it easier to contest
algorithmic decisions, and facilitate informed dialogue between
users, developers, algorithmic systems, and other stakeholders.
2 A BRIEF PRIMER ON EXPLANATIONS IN
PHILOSOPHY
Our interest in the philosophical treatment of explanations is based
on observation of the development of the field of xAI, or research
addressing interpretability and explainability in machine learning.
Our aim is to determine whether xAI is heading in a direction in
which explanations can be produced that allow affected parties,
regulators, and other non-insiders to understand, discuss, and po-
tentially contest decisions made by black-box algorithmic models.
So our primary question is: which types of explanations are cur-
rently being produced by xAI? And, are these explanations actually
useful to the individuals (or proxies thereof) affected by black-box
decisions?
Explanations, and more broadly epistemology, causality, and jus-
tification, have been the focus of philosophy for millennia, making
a complete overview of the field unfeasible. What follows is a brief
review of key distinctions and terminology relevant to our interest
in methods for providing explanations of black-box algorithmic
models and decisions. This primer broadly follows the structure es-
tablished in a recent review of the contribution of the social sciences
to xAI (see: Miller (2017)).
Briefly, the xAI community investigates interpretability (or ex-
plainability) and ways of providing explanations of algorithmic
models and decisions. ‘Interpretability’ refers to the degree of hu-
man comprehensibility of a given ‘black-box’ model or decision
(Lisboa, 2013; Miller, 2017). Poorly interpretable models “are opaque
in the sense that if one is a recipient of the output of the algorithm
(the classification decision), rarely does one have any concrete sense
of how or why a particular classification has been arrived at from
inputs” (Burrell, 2016, p.1).
In contrast, ‘explanation’ refers to numerous ways of exchanging
information about a phenomenon, in this case the functionality
of a model or the rationale and criteria for a decision, to different
stakeholders (Lipton, 2016; Miller, 2017). Explanations of machine
learning models and predictions can serve many functions and
audiences. Explanations can be necessary to comply with relevant
legislation (Doshi-Velez et al., 2017), verify and improve the func-
tionality of a system (i.e. as a type of ‘debugging’; (Kulesza et al.,
2015)) and help developers and humansworkingwith a system learn
from it (Samek et al., 2017), and enhance the trust between individ-
uals subject to a decision and the system itself (Citron and Pasquale,
2014; Hildebrandt and Koops, 2010; Zarsky, 2013). As these pur-
poses suggest, explanations can be offered to expert developers,
professionals working in tandem with a system (e.g. expert labelers
of training cases; see Berendt and Preibusch (2017) for an overview
of human actors involved in algorithmic decision-making), and to
individuals or groups affected by a system’s outputs (Mantelero,
2016; Weller, 2017).
Our interest here is solely in ways of providing explanations.
Returning to philosophy, types of explanations can be distinguished
according to their completeness, or the degree to which the entire
causal chain and necessity of an event can be explained (Ruben,
2004). Often this is expressed as the difference between ‘scientific’
and ‘everyday’ explanations (both of which deal with causes of an
event; e.g. Miller (2017), or ‘scientific’ (full) and ‘ordinary’ (partial)
causal explanations (Ruben, 2004). Miller argues that ‘everyday
explanations’ address “why particular facts (events, properties, de-
cisions, etc.) occurred,” rather than general scientific relationships
(Miller, 2017, p. 5).
While these distinctions hide significant nuance, they matter
insofar as they constrain the scope of our focus in discussing ex-
planations in AI. In recent calls for explanations in AI, and in work
on interpretability in machine learning more broadly, explanations
are requested in connection to a particular entity, be it a specific
decision, event, trained model, or application. The explanations
requested are thus not full scientific explanations, as they need not
appeal to general relationships or scientific laws, but rather at most
to causal relationships between the set of variables in a given model
(Woodward, 1997). As such, xAI is effectively calling for everyday
explanations either of how a trained model functions in general, or
how it behaved in a particular case.
3 EXPLAINABLE AI
Much recent work has been dedicated to rendering machine learn-
ing models interpretable or explainable. Two broad aims of work on
interpretability have been recognised in the literature: transparency
and post-hoc interpretation. Transparency addresses how a model
functions internally, whereas post-hoc interpretations concern how
the model behaves (Lepri et al., 2017; Lipton, 2016; Montavon et al.,
2017). Transparency can be further specified according to its target.
Respectively, a mechanistic understanding of the functioning of
the model (simulatability), individual components (decomposabil-
ity), and the training algorithm (algorithmic transparency) can be
sought. Models can be rendered transparent by explanations at a
minimum of three levels: “at the level of the entire model, at the
level of individual components (e.g., parameters), and at the level
of a particular training algorithm” (Lepri et al., 2017). A model, its
component parts, or its training/learning algorithm can thus be
said to be transparent if their functionality can be comprehended
in their entirety by a person (Lipton, 2016).
Post-hoc human interpretable explanations of models and spe-
cific decisions do not seek to reveal how a model functions, but
rather how it behaved, and why. According to Lipton (2016), ap-
proaches to post-hoc interpretability include verbal (natural lan-
guage) explanations (e.g. McAuley and Leskovec (2013)), visualisa-
tions and interactive interfaces (e.g. Simonyan et al. (2013); Tam-
agnini et al. (2017)), local explanations or approximations (e.g. Fong
and Vedaldi (2017); Ribeiro et al. (2016)), and case-based explana-
tions (e.g. Caruana et al. (1999); Kim et al. (2014)).
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Natural language explanations can consist of “textual or visual
artefacts that provide qualitative understanding of the relationship”
between features of an input (e.g. words in a document) and the
model’s output (e.g. a classification or prediction; (Ribeiro et al.,
2016). Visualisation techniques can visually demonstrate the rel-
ative influence of features or particular pixels (e.g. in the case of
an image classifier), or provide an interface for users to explore
textual or visual explanations (Poulin et al., 2006; Tamagnini et al.,
2017). Local explanations seek to explain how a fixed model leads
to a particular prediction, either by fitting a simpler, local model
around a particular decision (Ribeiro et al., 2016), or by perturbing
variables to measure how the prediction changes (Adler et al., 2016;
Datta et al., 2016; Simonyan et al., 2013). Case-based explanation
methods (Caruana et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2014) for non-cased based
machine learning involve using the trained model as a distance
metric to determine which cases in the training data set are most
similar to the case or decision to be explained. These training cases
can then be shared with parties affected by the decision.
Despite this variety of approaches, a significant amount of the
xAI community now pursues methods to retro-fit local or approx-
imate models over more complex algorithms. These simplified
models approximate the true criteria used to make decisions (e.g.
Baehrens et al. (2010); Ribeiro et al. (2016); Selvaraju et al. (2016);
Simonyan et al. (2013)). Broadly speaking there are two widely used
classes of model (i) Linear or Gradient-based approximations that
assign a single importance weight to each feature (be it someone’s
age, or a particular pixel in an image) and (ii) Decision tree-based
methods that use nested sets of yes/no decisions to approximate
classifiers.
These methods can both be applied to create approximations at
a global3 or local4 level. Historically, much work has focused on
global approximations of models (e.g. Craven and Shavlik (1996);
Martens et al. (2007); Sanchez et al. (2015), including approaches
based on clustering (Chen et al., 2016), integer programming (Zeng
et al., 2017), and rule lists (Wang and Rudin, 2015)). In contrast,
local approximations are accurate representations only of a specific
domain or ‘slice’ of a model. A trade-off inherently occurs between
the insightfulness of the approximated model, the simplicity of the
presented function, and the size of the domain to which is applies
and remains valid (Bastani et al., 2017; Lakkaraju et al., 2017).
No matter the approach taken in xAI, reflexivity is needed to
ensure the community actually works towards its normative and
practical goals to render models holistically transparent or provide
high-quality post-hoc interpretations of model behaviour. Critical
questions must be repeatedly asked and answered. For example,
will the methods developed make machine learning models more in-
terpretable? More trustworthy to users? More accountable? And to
whom will explanations be accessible, comprehensible, and useful?
Answering such questions requires considering the methods de-
veloped in xAI in the context of prior work in fields addressing such
normative and social questions. Local and approximation models
may in fact resemble existing, well-known approaches to explana-
tions in the ’explanation sciences’, which would provide insight
3Offering a simplified model or a set of simplified models that approximates decisions
made for all possible datapoints.
4A simplified model that only approximates decisions made about a few datapoints,
typically only a single exemplar.
into their practical value and limitations for users, developers, and
other stakeholders going forward.
3.1 Scientific Modelling and Explainable AI
We believe that the closest analogue for the bulk of methods cur-
rently occupying xAI researchers lies in the use of scientific mod-
elling, or the building of approximate models that are not intended
to capture the full behaviour of physical systems but rather to
provide coarse approximations of how the systems behave. These
approximations are useful to experts both for pedagogical purposes
and for making reliable predictions of how the systemmight behave
over a restricted domain, but can be misleading when presented as
an explanation of how the model functions to a lay user.
One famous example of this problem is Newtonian physics,
which is taught first to schoolchildren and provides a good enough
description for much day-to-day engineering, but that famously
breaks down as an approximation when high-precision is required
at either very large or very small scales, where either general rela-
tivity or quantum physics are necessary.5 Both general relativity
and quantum physics are also examples of such models. Although
extremely accurate in their domains, outside of them they break
down, and a unified model of physics that is accurate at all scales
is still being sought.
Much scientific theory can be understood as the use and charac-
terisation of such models (Box, 1979; Frigg, 2006; Herfel et al., 1995).
Although any physical system can be understood in terms of the
emergent properties of subatomic particles, such descriptions are
neither human comprehensible nor computationally feasible. In-
stead, scientists deal in local approximations that provide accurate
descriptions of the phenomena they are interested in, but which
may prove inaccurate in a larger domain.
It is in this context that Box’s maxim, “All models are wrong, but
some are useful,” (Box, 1979) should be understood. Explainable AI
generates approximate simple models and calls them ‘explanations’,
suggesting reliable knowledge of how a complex model functions.
When characterising the use of such models in science, Hesse
(1965) divides the properties of the model into positive analogies,
where the properties of the model are known to correspond to prop-
erties of the phenomena we are interested in; negative analogies,
where the properties of the model do not match the phenomena
we are interested in; and neutral analogies, where it is unknown if
the properties of the model correspond to the phenomena.
This characterisation captures many of the challenges when of-
fering approximations of models as explanations. It is not enough
to simply offer a human interpretable model as an explanation.
For an individual to be able to trust such a model as an approx-
imation, they must know over which domain a model is reliable
and accurate, where it breaks down, and where its behaviour is
uncertain. If the recipient of a local approximation does not under-
stand its limitations, at best it is not comprehensible, and at worst
misleading.
This is not to say that local approximations are without merit,
but rather that they can only reliably have explanatory power if
5Famously, GPS satellites are insufficiently accurate unless they account for effects of
general relativity.
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their limitations are clearly documented and understood by recip-
ients. For domain experts with in-depth knowledge of when and
where approximations break down, or for technicians that have a
clearly defined and tested remit for where the approximation can
be used, they can be extremely useful. However, at the moment
xAI generally avoids the challenges of testing and validating ap-
proximation models, or fully characterising their domain. If these
elements are well understood by the individual, models can offer
more information than an explanation of a single decision or event.
Over the domain for which the model accurately maps onto the
phenomena we are interested in, it can be used to answer ‘what
if’ questions, for example “What would the outcome be if the data
looked like this instead?” and to search for contrastive explanations,
for example “How could I alter the data to get outcome X?”
However, local models may also provide false assurances. As
suggested above, local approximations are often misleading or inac-
curate outside of their domain, and provide little insight into how a
function response and outcomes vary with changes to the inputs. By
definition local explanations hold only for a specific decision; what
is explained is not how the model functions as a whole, but rather
one segment of the model relevant to the prediction at hand. Thus,
while helpful to explain the weights and relationships between
variables in a small segment of a model (relevant to a particular
case or decision), the explanations do not provide evidence of the
trustworthiness or acceptability of the model overall.
3.2 Linear approximations
To provide further support for the analogue between xAI and sci-
entific modelling, we turn now to variants of linear approximation.
Many of the issues and design decisions made by researchers in the
field point directly towards the issues with modelling previously,
particularly the three-way trade-off between the simplicity of the
approximated model, the size of the domain it describes, and the
accuracy of this description.
3.2.1 Linear Models in Continuous Spaces. Linear models are de-
signed to give a single measure of the importance of each variable to
the classifier they are approximating. In some cases (e.g. Lundberg
and Lee (2017); Ribeiro et al. (2016), these weights can be directly
interpreted as the sensitivity or a number that tells you how much
the classifier response will vary as a particular feature changes. In
other words, if a particular variable has a weight of associated with
it, altering the variable by small amount will cause the classifier
to vary by approximately . Regardless of whether linear models
are intended to be a local approximation of a classifier or a simple
importance measure, they suffer from two distinct issues. The first
is a problem of curvature, namely that the sensitivity of a classifier
to a change in a particular variable may vary with the amount the
variable changes. The second issue is one of dependencies between
variables and how to capture the relationships between them.
Both of these issues can be illustrated by an example taken from
Miller (2017). Suppose, I believe that a particular creature is a bee
because I have been told it has 6 legs and four wings. I am unlikely
to change my mind if I am told it actually has three wings. The
most reasonable explanation for a three winged insect is that it
was originally a four winged insect that lost a wing, but if I’m told
that it has two wings I may well believe that it is a fly. This is
an example of the sensitivity varying with the size of the change
made. On the other hand, I will only be comfortable believing it is
a spider if it has both eight legs and no wings. Should I then say
that my belief depends wholly on the number of legs it has; wholly
on the number of wings; or weakly on both? As linear models do
not capture the interdependencies between variables, they cannot
accurately characterise these relationships. In all such cases, when a
local model is fitted to the classifier response, the choice of domain
or variable values governs how well the approximation performs.
3.2.2 Gradient Sensitivity verses Binarization. There are two
main schools of thought regarding the problems of varying sensi-
tivity and scale. The first notes that the sensitivity of a classifier
is only well defined when the size of in the previous section tends
towards zero. In this case, the sensitivity is equivalent to the gradi-
ent. Although well defined, this essentially means that the model
is fitted to a domain of size 0 and may exhibit large amounts of
instability while offering limited predictive power. Two prominent
approaches are described by Simonyan et al. (2013) and Baehrens
et al. (2010).
The other option, andmost influentially proposed by Ribeiro et al.
(2016) in their Locally Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations
(LIME) approach, is to binarize the problem. Rather than trying to
fit a linear classifier to a large range of values, the authors consider
a binary problem, where for each feature they attempt to switch
it on and off, allowing them to answer the question “What is the
contribution of feature f to the classifier response, given the data it
currently sees?” This leaves open the question of “the contribution
compared to what?” For unstructured data, such as a count of how
many times particular words occur in a document, it makes sense
to compare against a baseline created by setting the count to 0. For
structured data this is more problematic. For example, how can
we evaluate the importance of someone’s salary to a loan decision,
if the classifier can only evaluate people with valid salaries? The
answer is to compare it against a different valid salary, but it is
unclear how this valid salary should be chosen.
This issue is even more apparent when creating local approxi-
mations of computer vision algorithms, as individual pixels cannot
be removed from an image, but only set to different values. Several
options have been proposed. LIME appeared to set regions of the
image to an unspecified homogeneous value (Ribeiro et al., 2016).
Deep Taylor Decomposition (Montavon et al., 2017) suggests blur-
ring the image, an operation which preserves colour information
but removes texture. DeepLift uses a user-specified value (Shriku-
mar et al., 2017, 2016), while layerwise relevance propagation sets
internal network values to 0 (Montavon et al., 2017). Each of these
choices is an implicit restriction of the domain over which themodel
is fitted and carries different implications for the kinds of model
found, and can substantially alter the importance given to features.
For example, contrasting current image values against a particular
colour, such as grey, makes it appear that grey pixels have no effect,
while contrasting an image against its blurred version makes it
appear as if only high-frequency texture cues are important and
that the classifier does not use colour information.
3.2.3 Linear models in high-dimensional spaces. Having made
a choice of a binarization as discussed in the previous section, a
question then remains as to which of these values to approximate
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with a linear model. Even after restricting a function defined over a
continuous high-dimensional range to a set of binary variables, this
gives a (hyper-)cube of possible values while a linear function can
only uniquely specify values, with all other values being a linear
approximation of that (see Figure 1 for an illustration). This raises
the question of which of these values are important to approximate.
For example, should we only pay attention to contrasting solutions
closest to the original solution as suggested by DeepLift (illustrated
by Figure 1 centre; (Shrikumar et al., 2017, 2016)); uniformly weight
over all possible values, suggested by SHAPE (Lundberg and Lee,
2017) (Figure 1 right); or pay as much attention to values close
to the data point as to those close to the alternate solution (e.g. a
solid grey image); or a weighted mixture of the two approaches (e.g.
Figure 1 left LIME; (Ribeiro et al., 2016))?
3.3 Exploring alternatives to scientific
modelling
Local approximations thus face difficulties with generalizability,
arbitrariness in choice of domain, and the potential to mislead
recipients unless the domain and epistemic limitations of the ap-
proximation are known. Given these difficulties, other methods of
producing explanations may be preferable from the perspective of
the user or individual affected by a black-box system. The utility
of local approximations is dependent upon the knowledge of the
recipient regarding the approximations limitations, including con-
ditions under which it will break down and provide a misleading
explanation of the decision-making model. Local approximations
can be useful as a type of ‘explanation kit’ or causal chain that
allows expert users to explore slices of a model for prototyping or
debugging (Miller, 2017, p.17)(Poulin et al., 2006). However, their
ultimate utility and reliability for non-experts, including individuals
subject to decisions made by the system, is highly questionable.
This finding raises the question: might other methods for gener-
ating explanations perform better, or at least offer different benefits,
than local approximations? Can other methods provide more reli-
able or personally relevant information for non-experts to enhance
accountability and trustworthiness in algorithmic systems?
4 CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATIONS
Thus far we have discussed the philosophical and practical pur-
poses of scientific models, which can be understood as partial causal
scientific explanations that assist in comprehending a piece of the
functionality of a phenomenon (Ruben, 2004). Given the difficul-
ties faced by local approximations, it is worth examining prior
work in the ’explanation sciences’ to identify potential alternative
approaches to generate reliable and practically useful post-hoc in-
terpretations for parties affected by an algorithmic decisions. If
our goal is to produce explanations that are comprehensible and
useful to expert as well as non-expert stakeholders, it is sensible
to examine theoretical as well as empirical work describing how
humans give and receive explanations (Miller, 2017, p.3-4).
In recent decades, work in the philosophy of science and epis-
temology has paid increasing attention to theories of contrastive
explanations and counterfactual causality (e.g. Kment (2006); Lewis
(1973); Ruben (2004); Woodward and Zalta (2003)). In short, con-
trastive theories argue that causal explanations inevitably involve
appeal to a counterfactual case, be it a cause or event, which did
not occur. A canonical example is provided by Lipton Lipton (1990):
“To explain why P rather than Q, we must cite a causal difference
between P and not-Q, consisting of a cause of P and the absence
of a corresponding event in the history of not-Q” . Some authors
go so far as to claim all questions about causality are inherently
contrastive (Lewis, 1973; Ruben, 2004).
Contrastive theories of explanation are of course not without
criticism. Ruben (2004), for example, has suggested that, even if
causal explanations are inevitably contrastive in nature (which he
doubts), this characteristic can be dealt with by traditional theo-
ries of explanation, rendering the ‘contrastive turn’ interesting but
ultimately unnecessary. While the utility of contrastive theories
remains debated, the fact that contrastive explanations address a
particular event or case and are thus simpler to generate than com-
plete or global explanations of model functionality suggest they
worth further consideration in xAI (Lipton, 1990).
A recent review by Miller (2017) suggests substantial empirical
support exists for the practical utility of ‘everyday’ contrastive
explanations. Miller reviewed articles and empirical studies from
“philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science of how people define,
select, evaluate, and present explanations” (Miller, 2017, p.1). His
analysis highlighted three primary characteristics of explanations
as they are used, selected, evaluated, and shared by individuals:
4.1 Human explanations are contrastive
‘Everyday explanations’ are “sought in response to particular coun-
terfactual cases...That is, people do not ask why event P happened,
but rather why event P happened instead of some event Q” (Miller,
2017, p.5).6 The preference for contrastive explanations is not due
merely to the cognitive complexity of non-contrastive explanations,
for example the number of links in a causal chain. Rather, the re-
viewed empirical evidence indicates that humans psychologically
prefer contrastive explanations (Miller, 2017, p.18)(Rehder, 2003,
2006).
The perceived abnormality of an event influences requests for
contrastive explanations which address why a normal or expected
event did not occur (Hilton and Slugoski, 1986; McClure et al., 2003;
Samland and Waldmann, 2014). ‘Normal’ behaviour has empirically
been shown to be judged as “more explainable than abnormal be-
haviour,” with perceived abnormality playing an important role
in explanation selection (Miller, 2017, p.41). Gregor and Benbasat
(1999) support the importance of abnormality, suggesting that users
request explanations when an anomaly or abnormal event is de-
tected. Lim and Dey (2009) similarly note a positive relationship
between the perceived "inappropriateness" of application behaviour
and user requests for contrastive explanations. Violation of ethical
and social norms can likewise set an event apart as abnormal (Hilton,
1996). Explanations addressing why an alternative, expected event
6It is worth noting that counterfactual cases in contrastive, everyday explanations of
algorithmic decisions are not equivalent to counterfactuals used to assess causality
(Miller, 2017, p.13)(Hilton and Slugoski, 1986; Woodward, 1997), in the sense that the
range of possible alternatives is necessarily bounded by the limitations of the model
in question and the features available to it. This invariance in the model allows for
reliable contrastive or counterfactual explanations to be computed (Woodward, 1997).
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Figure 1: An illustration of the different weighting scheme used in fitting linear models. LIME (leftmost) weights all examples
differently based on how far they are from the original data point (illustrated by different coloured vertices), while DeepLift
(centre) only fits the linear weights to the individual edges closest to the original data point (coloured pink). SHAPE (right)
fits weights by averaging over all edges formed by flipping a single variable from off to on (each group averaged together is
indicated by a single colour). Each of these different approaches equates to a different assumption as to which samples are
most important, and none of them can be said a priori to be better than any of the others.
did not occur have historically been addressed in the experts sys-
tems literature, seen for instance in the discussion of "Why Not"
explanations by Lim and Dey (2009).
4.2 Human explanations are selective
Full or scientific explanations are rarely if ever realised in practice.
Absent general laws or the complete causal chain leading to an
event, multiple explanations are typically possible that attribute
different causes. A given cause of set of causes may be incomplete
insofar as they are not the sole cause of the event, but nonetheless
convey useful information to the recipient in a given context or for
a given purpose (Ylikoski, 2013). As Miller argues, “Explanations
are selected – people rarely, if ever, expect an explanation that
consists of an actual and complete cause of an event. Humans are
adept at selecting one or two causes from a sometimes infinite
number of causes to be the explanation” (Miller, 2017, p.5). Further,
to be informative, explanations should not be entirely reducible
to presuppositions, or beliefs that the recipient of the explanation
already holds (Hesslow, 1988). They should further be relevant to
the question asked by the recipient (epistemic relevance; (Miller,
2017), or what Slugoski et al. (1993) describe as the recipient’s
context.
When an explanation giver (’explainer’) selects an explanation
for an event, possible or actual causes can be ‘backgrounded’ or
’discounted’, meaning they are disregarded on the basis of contex-
tual information that renders them irrelevant to the purposes of the
explainer or recipient of an explanation (the ’explainee’). This type
of selection is essential to reduce long causal chains to a cognitively
manageable size (Hilton, 1996). In xAI, selection often takes the
form of key features or evidence being emphasised in explanation
interfaces based upon their relative weight or influence on a given
prediction or output (Biran and McKeown, 2014; Poulin et al., 2006).
As the observations above suggest, the relevance of features (and
explanations addressing them) would be based not only on ’sta-
tistical weight’, but also the explainee’s subjective interests and
expectations.
4.3 Human explanations are social
Explanations are social, insofar as they involve an interaction be-
tween one or more explainers and explainees. Interactive transfer
of knowledge is required in which information is tailored according
to the recipient’s beliefs and comprehensional capacities (Miller,
2017, p.5). Explanations can be conceived as involving one or more
explainers and explainees engaging in information transfer through
dialogue, visual representation, or other means (Hilton, 1990), often
to correct information or knowledge assymetry (Lim and Dey, 2009).
In the case of machine learning models, it is perhaps most useful
to always treat explanation generation as an interactive process,
initially involving a mix of human and automated actors, at a mini-
mum an inquirer (e.g. a developer, user) and the model or system
(Kayande et al., 2009; Martens and Provost, 2013). Further, explana-
tions are iterative, insofar as they must be selected and evaluated
on the basis of shared presuppositions and beliefs. Relevance is key,
and iteration may be required to communicate effectively or clarify
points of confusion on the path towards a mutually understood
explanation.
Together, these characteristics of everyday explanations reveal
that they “are not just the presentation of causes (causal attribu-
tion). While an event may have many causes, often the explainee
cares only about a small subset (relevant to the contrast case), the
explainer selects a subset of this subset (based on several different
criteria), and explainer and explainee may interact and argue about
this explanation” (Miller, 2017, p.6).
4.4 Contrastive explanations in xAI
Contrastive methods of generating explanations are responsive
to these three characteristics of explanations emphasised in the
’explanation sciences’. Two approaches for directly computing con-
trastive explanations are described by Martens and Provost (2013)
and Wachter et al. (2018).7 Such post-hoc methods avoid many
7These methods resemble the aforementioned "Why Not" explanations described by
Lim and Dey (2009), and are related to work on adversarial perturbations (e.g. (Dube,
2018; Goodfellow et al., 2014)
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of the difficulties faced by model-based explanations. Rather than
explicitly generating a model that approximates functional values
over a restrictive domain, and relying on the user to interpret this,
contrastive explanations directly offer an alternative data point:
“If your data had looked like this, you would have been given this
classification score instead.” These alternative data points can be
computed exactly. As such, many of the challenges facing ’mod-
elling’ approaches to generating explanations, such as the quality
of the approximation or the limits of a chosen domain, do not arise
to a comparable degree.
However, as contrastive methods only return a single data point,
a more pressing concern is the relevance of the output. If this data
point does not directly correspond to a factoid of interest to the
user, it cannot be used to deduce relevant conclusions, for example
regarding the justifiability of a decision. Similar issues arise in
the fitting of models: if the domain the model is fitted to does
not capture examples relevant to the intended audience, then it is
unlikely to be useful.
The first approach described by Martens and Provost (2013) is
explicitly designed for use on discrete data, and focuses on the
particular problem of which words need to be removed from a
website in order for it to be no longer be classified as an adult
(i.e. pornographic) website. In contrast, Wachter et al. (2018) pro-
pose a method, ’counterfactual explanations’, designed to work on
primarily continuous data. They illustrate their approach on the
problem of law school admissions and risk factors likely to increase
a patient’s chance of developing diabetes.
Finding such counterfactuals explanations can be described as
a search or optimisation problem. Such approaches seek a similar
counterfactual that is both close to the original datapoint and likely
to occur in the real world (Kment, 2006). In the case of Wachter
et al. (2018) this was formulated as a Lagrangian style constrained
optimisation:
argmin
c
max
λ
λ(f (c) −T )2 + d(c, x) (1)
Where x is the original data point, and c the counterfactual. f (c)
is the classification response from the black-box function f , which
is constrained to take target value T . d(·, ·) is a distance function
that ensures that the counterfactual is a relevant, and a human
comprehensible change to the original datapoint.
5 TOWARDS COMMUNICATIVE,
CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATIONS
Such methods for computing contrastive explanations seek to pro-
vide contextually-relevant information to parties affected by a deci-
sion by describing how relevant closely related, alternative events
could have occurred. However, choosing a relevant set of cases
or events against which contrastive explanations are provided is
not a straightforward challenge. The way in which information
is transferred has a substantial impact on the quality and psycho-
logical acceptability of explanations (Hilton, 1990). The recipient’s
beliefs about an event to be explained are similarly constrained by
the explainer’s choice of explanation. As a result, the explainer’s
epistemological and normative values can have a significant effect
on the recipient’s understanding of an event. Lombrozo (2009) for
example demonstrated that the type of explanation provided (e.g.
mechanistic, functional) can influence the recipient’s view of the
importance of features in categorising a phenomenon (Poulin et al.,
2006). Explainers and explainees can have different motivations, for
example to generate trust (explainer) or understand non-intuitive
causes of a decision (explainee), meaning conflicts can arise in
explanation selection and evaluation.
The normativity of this relationship means that a risk exists of
malicious explainers subtly discouraging explainees from critically
questioning or contesting a decision through choice of explana-
tion(s). This risk is particularly acute when explanations are given
to foster trust or understanding. A recipient’s beliefs can potentially
be ‘gamed’ or manipulated to align with the explainer’s preferred
explanation of a phenomenon, meaning recipients can be ‘nudged’
to take a preferred action (or not). Seemingly rational bases for oth-
erwise unjustifiable decisions can for example be offered to nudge
the recipient not to question or contest the decision. Lipton (2016)
has urged for caution in adopting post-hoc interpretation methods
due to this potential to mislead recipients, for example by falsely
attributing a decision to an irrelevant feature, or a more acceptable
feature (e.g. post code, ’leadership’) that serves as a proxy for a
legally protected feature (cf. Barocas and Selbst (2016); Kim (2016)).
These risks may be mitigated by developing methods to provide
contrastive, selective, and social explanations that not only enable
information exchange and dialogue between giver and recipient,
but critical argumentation and discussion of the justifiability of an
event as well. This suggestion stems from prior work that suggests
conversational explanations are essentially a form of argumenta-
tion. Conversational explanations are used to both offer causes of
an event and back claims as to the truth or relevance of these causes
(Antaki and Leudar, 1992). Walton (2004, 2007) takes a similar ap-
proach in proposing a dialectical theory of everyday explanations,
which suggests that giving explanations involves not only transfer
of information or causal claims, but also argumentative support for
these claims.
These findings, that explanations are given via conversation
and resemble argumentation, reveal a mechanistic link between
explanation and justification as a type of discourse (Fox et al., 2007).
Justification is also often a discursive act, relying upon explana-
tions to transfer knowledge and support claims made by each party.
Interest in justification stems from an individual’s ability to com-
prehend decisions made about them, and contest them when they
are obviously incorrect or found unacceptable (or unjustifiable).
As such, argumentation models of explanation resemble theories
of justification and democracy based upon discourse, such as Jur-
gen Habermas’ discourse ethics (located in his broader Theory of
Communicative Action; (Habermas, 1984)).
Justification has recently received increasing attention by schol-
ars discussing algorithmic accountability (e.g. Binns (2017); Biran
and McKeown (2014); Hildebrandt and Koops (2010); Selbst and
Barocas (2018); Weller (2017)). However, justification currently oc-
cupies an uneasy position in xAI, in that it is rarely formally defined
or related to explanations or ideals of transparency and accountabil-
ity.8 This unease is perhaps understandable; as Binns (2017) notes,
legitimate disagreements between epistemic and ethical standards
8Biran and McKeown (2014) prove an exception to this rule. They define explanation
as an answer to the question "how did the system arrive at the prediction?" whereas
justification answers the question "why should we believe the prediction is correct?"
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for algorithmic decision-making can exist which require resolution,
for example through democratic processes. Despite this, important
conversations around the ethical acceptability or justifiability of al-
gorithmic systems must occur in society if responsible deployment
is sought.
Finally, very little work in xAI addresses the link between in-
terpretability and contestability of models or decisions (Lipton,
2016). Going forward, explanations of specific algorithmic decisions
should allow the justification of a black-box model or decision to
be debated and contested.. If we use justificatory discourse as a
framework for explanation requirements, we need to determine
what sort of records algorithmic systems must retain in order to
allow for contesting and post-hoc auditing of abnormal events
(Mittelstadt, 2016; Sandvig et al., 2014), for instance through identi-
fication of classification errors or inaccurate input data (Poulin et al.,
2006). Where approximations are used to provide explanations, in-
formation should also be provided to affected parties detailing the
limitations and relative resilience of the approximation, including
the domain addressed and why it has been chosen. Further, mean-
ingful, critical dialogue can be achieved between user, developer,
and model by ensuring explanations are contrastive, selective, and
social. We thus need to ensure xAI aims to develop methods for pro-
ducing explanations of model functionality and specific decisions
that embody these characteristics. Reliable methods for producing
contrastive explanations and explanation by approximation are
both required.
At the moment, the xAI community largely fails in this task.
Many approaches produce approximate and local models that are
more akin to models in science. It may be possible to ask questions
of these models, and to develop contrastive explanations from them,
and so they are not without value. But they do not help us directly
provide contrastive explanations to parties affected by algorithmic
decisions. Going forward, the field must urgently close this gap.
REFERENCES
Philip Adler, Casey Falk, Sorelle A. Friedler, Gabriel Rybeck, Car-
los Scheidegger, Brandon Smith, and Suresh Venkatasubrama-
nian. 2016. Auditing Black-box Models by Obscuring Features.
arXiv:1602.07043 [cs, stat] (22 2 2016). http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.
07043 arXiv: 1602.07043.
Charles Antaki and Ivan Leudar. 1992. Explaining in conversa-
tion: Towards an argument model. European Journal of Social
Psychology 22, 2 (1992), 181–194.
David Baehrens, Timon Schroeter, Stefan Harmeling, Motoaki
Kawanabe, Katja Hansen, and Klaus-Robert Müller. 2010. How
to explain individual classification decisions. Journal of Machine
Learning Research 11, Jun (2010), 1803 – 1831.
Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst. 2016. Big data’s disparate
impact. California Law Review 104, 3 (2016). https://doi.org/10.
15779/Z38BG31
Osbert Bastani, Carolyn Kim, and Hamsa Bastani. 2017. Inter-
pretability via Model Extraction. arXiv:1706.09773 [cs, stat] (29 6
2017). http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.09773 arXiv: 1706.09773.
They further suggest that a satisfactory answer to the first question will also provide
an answer to the second for explainees with sufficient expertise.
Bettina Berendt and Sören Preibusch. 2017. Toward Accountable
Discrimination-Aware Data Mining: The Importance of Keeping
the Human in the Loop and Under the Looking Glass. Big Data
5, 2 (1 6 2017), 135–152. https://doi.org/10.1089/big.2016.0055
Reuben Binns. 2017. Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason.
Philosophy & Technology (24 5 2017), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.
1007/s13347-017-0263-5
Or Biran and Kathleen McKeown. 2014. Justification narratives for
individual classifications. In Proceedings of the AutoML workshop
at ICML, Vol. 2014.
B. Bodo, N. Helberger, K. Irion, F. Zuiderveen Borgesius, J. Moller, B.
van de Velde, N. Bol, B. van Es, and C. de Vreese. 2017. Tackling
the algorithmic control crisis-the technical, legal, and ethical
challenges of research into algorithmic agents. Yale JL & Tech.
19 (2017), 133.
George EP Box. 1979. Robustness in the strategy of scientific model
building. In Robustness in statistics. Elsevier, 201–236.
Jenna Burrell. 2016. How the Machine ’Thinks:’ Understanding
Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms. Big Data & Society
(2016). https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951715622512
R. Caruana, H. Kangarloo, J. D. Dionisio, U. Sinha, and D. Johnson.
1999. Case-based explanation of non-case-based learning meth-
ods. Proceedings of the AMIA Symposium (1999), 212–215. PMID:
10566351 PMCID: PMC2232607.
Junxiang Chen, Yale Chang, Brian Hobbs, Peter Castaldi, Michael
Cho, Edwin Silverman, and Jennifer Dy. 2016. Interpretable Clus-
tering via Discriminative Rectangle Mixture Model. Data Mining
(ICDM), 2016 IEEE 16th International Conference on, 823 – 828.
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7837910/ [Online;
accessed 2017-10-16].
Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale. 2014. The scored society:
due process for automated predictions. Wash. L. Rev. 89 (2014),
1.
Mark Craven and Jude W. Shavlik. 1996. Extracting tree-structured
representations of trained networks. Advances in neural in-
formation processing systems, 24 – 30. http://papers.nips.cc/paper/
1152-extracting-tree-structured-representations-of-trained-networks.
pdf [Online; accessed 2017-10-16].
Anupam Datta, Shayak Sen, and Yair Zick. 2016. Algorithmic Trans-
parency via Quantitative Input Influence: Theory and Experi-
ments with Learning Systems. IEEE, 598–617. https://doi.org/10.
1109/SP.2016.42 [Online; accessed 2016-09-12].
Finale Doshi-Velez, Mason Kortz, Ryan Budish, Chris Bavitz, Sam
Gershman, David O’Brien, Stuart Schieber, James Waldo, David
Weinberger, and Alexandra Wood. 2017. Accountability of
AI under the law: The role of explanation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1711.01134 (2017).
Simant Dube. 2018. High Dimensional Spaces, Deep Learning and
Adversarial Examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.00634 (2018).
Ruth C. Fong and Andrea Vedaldi. 2017. Interpretable explana-
tions of black boxes by meaningful perturbation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1704.03296 (2017).
John Fox, David Glasspool, Dan Grecu, Sanjay Modgil, Matthew
South, and Vivek Patkar. 2007. Argumentation-based inference
and decision making–A medical perspective. IEEE intelligent
systems 22, 6 (2007).
Explaining Explanations in AI FAT*’19, January 2019, Atlanta, Georgia USA
Roman Frigg. 2006. Scientific Representation and the Semantic
View of Theories. Theoria 55 (2006), 37–53.
Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. 2014.
Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6572 (2014).
Shirley Gregor and Izak Benbasat. 1999. Explanations from in-
telligent systems: Theoretical foundations and implications for
practice. MIS quarterly (1999), 497–530.
J. Habermas. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 1:
Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Beacon, Boston.
William Herfel, Wladiyslaw Krajewski, Ilkka Niiniluoto, and Wojci-
cki (Eds.). 1995. Theories and Models in Scientific Process. Rodopi,
Amsterdam.
Mary B. Hesse. 1965. Models and analogies in science. (1965).
Germund Hesslow. 1988. The problem of causal selection. Contem-
porary science and natural explanation: Commonsense conceptions
of causality (1988), 11–32.
Mireille Hildebrandt and Bert-Jaap Koops. 2010. The Challenges
of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling Era. The
Modern Law Review 73, 3 (May 2010), 428–460. https://doi.org/
10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00806.x
Denis J. Hilton. 1990. Conversational processes and causal explana-
tion. Psychological Bulletin 107, 1 (1990), 65.
Denis J. Hilton. 1996. Mental models and causal explanation: Judge-
ments of probable cause and explanatory relevance. Thinking &
Reasoning 2, 4 (1996), 273–308.
Denis J. Hilton and Ben R. Slugoski. 1986. Knowledge-based causal
attribution: The abnormal conditions focus model. Psychological
review 93, 1 (1986), 75.
Ujwal Kayande, Arnaud De Bruyn, Gary L. Lilien, Arvind Ran-
gaswamy, and Gerrit H. Van Bruggen. 2009. How incorporating
feedback mechanisms in a DSS affects DSS evaluations. Informa-
tion Systems Research 20, 4 (2009), 527–546.
Been Kim, Cynthia Rudin, and Julie A. Shah. 2014. The bayesian
case model: A generative approach for case-based reasoning
and prototype classification. Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, 1952–1960.
Pauline T. Kim. 2016. Data-driven discrimination at work. Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 58 (2016), 857.
Boris Kment. 2006. Counterfactuals and explanation. Mind 115,
458 (2006), 261–310.
Joshua A. Kroll, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reiden-
berg, David G. Robinson, and Harlan Yu. 2016. Accountable
algorithms. U. Pa. L. Rev. 165 (2016), 633.
Todd Kulesza, Margaret Burnett, Weng-Keen Wong, and Simone
Stumpf. 2015. Principles of ExplanatoryDebugging to Personalize
Interactive Machine Learning. ACM Press, 126–137. https://doi.
org/10.1145/2678025.2701399 [Online; accessed 2018-05-06].
Himabindu Lakkaraju, Ece Kamar, Rich Caruana, and Jure Leskovec.
2017. Interpretable & Explorable Approximations of Black Box
Models. arXiv:1707.01154 [cs] (4 7 2017). http://arxiv.org/abs/
1707.01154 arXiv: 1707.01154.
Bruno Lepri, Nuria Oliver, Emmanuel Letouzé, Alex Pentland, and
Patrick Vinck. 2017. Fair, Transparent, and Accountable Algo-
rithmic Decision-making Processes: The Premise, the Proposed
Solutions, and the Open Challenges. Philosophy & Technology
(15 8 2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-017-0279-x [Online;
accessed 2017-08-25].
David Lewis. 1973. Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Oxford.
Brian Y. Lim and Anind K. Dey. 2009. Assessing demand for intelli-
gibility in context-aware applications. In Proceedings of the 11th
international conference on Ubiquitous computing - Ubicomp ’09.
ACM Press, Orlando, Florida, USA, 195. https://doi.org/10.1145/
1620545.1620576
Peter Lipton. 1990. Contrastive explanation. Royal Institute of
Philosophy Supplements 27 (1990), 247–266.
Zachary C. Lipton. 2016. The Mythos of Model Interpretability.
arXiv:1606.03490 [cs, stat] (10 6 2016). http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.
03490 arXiv: 1606.03490.
Paulo JG Lisboa. 2013. Interpretability in Machine Learning – Prin-
ciples and Practice. In Fuzzy Logic and Applications. Springer, 15 –
21. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-03200-9_
2 [Online; accessed 2015-12-19].
Tania Lombrozo. 2009. Explanation and categorization: How “why?”
informs “what?”. Cognition 110, 2 (2009), 248–253.
Scott M Lundberg and Su-In Lee. 2017. A unified approach to
interpretingmodel predictions. InAdvances in Neural Information
Processing Systems. 4765–4774.
Alessandro Mantelero. 2016. Personal data for decisional purposes
in the age of analytics: From an individual to a collective dimen-
sion of data protection. Computer law & security review 32, 2
(2016), 238–255.
David Martens, Bart Baesens, Tony Van Gestel, and Jan Vanthienen.
2007. Comprehensible credit scoringmodels using rule extraction
from support vector machines. European journal of operational
research 183, 3 (2007), 1466–1476.
David Martens and Foster Provost. 2013. Explaining data-driven
document classifications. (2013). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2282998 [Online; accessed 2017-09-22].
Julian McAuley and Jure Leskovec. 2013. Hidden factors and hidden
topics: understanding rating dimensions with review text. ACM
Press, 165–172. https://doi.org/10.1145/2507157.2507163 [Online;
accessed 2017-09-24].
John L. McClure, Robbie M. Sutton, and Denis J. Hilton. 2003. The
Role of Goal-Based Explanations. Social judgments: Implicit and
explicit processes 5 (2003).
Tim Miller. 2017. Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights
from the social sciences. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.07269 (2017).
Tim Miller, Piers Howe, and Liz Sonenberg. 2017. Explainable AI:
Beware of Inmates Running the Asylum Or: How I Learnt to
Stop Worrying and Love the Social and Behavioural Sciences.
arXiv:1712.00547 [cs] (1 12 2017). http://arxiv.org/abs/1712.00547
arXiv: 1712.00547.
Brent Mittelstadt. 2016. Automation, Algorithms, and Politics|
Auditing for Transparency in Content Personalization Systems.
International Journal of Communication 10 (2016), 12.
Grégoire Montavon, Wojciech Samek, and Klaus-Robert Müller.
2017. Methods for interpreting and understanding deep neural
networks. Digital Signal Processing (2017).
Helen Nissenbaum. 1996. Accountability in a computerized society.
Science and engineering ethics 2, 1 (1996), 25–42.
S. C. Olhede and P. J. Wolfe. 2018. The growing ubiquity of
algorithms in society: implications, impacts and innovations.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 376, 2128 (Sept. 2018), 20170364. https:
FAT*’19, January 2019, Atlanta, Georgia USA Mittelstadt, Russell, Wachter
//doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2017.0364
Frank Pasquale. 2015. The black box society: The secret algorithms
that control money and information. Harvard University Press.
Brett Poulin, Roman Eisner, Duane Szafron, Paul Lu, Russ Greiner,
D S Wishart, Alona Fyshe, Brandon Pearcy, Cam MacDonell, and
John Anvik. 2006. Visual Explanation of Evidence in Additive
Classifiers. (2006), 8.
Bob Rehder. 2003. A causal-model theory of conceptual represen-
tation and categorization. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition 29, 6 (2003), 1141.
Bob Rehder. 2006. When similarity and causality compete in
category-based property generalization. Memory & Cognition 34,
1 (2006), 3–16.
Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh, and Carlos Guestrin. 2016. "Why
Should I Trust You?": Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier.
In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD International Conference
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. ACM Press, 1135–1144.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2939672.2939778 [Online; accessed 2017-
09-24].
David-Hillel Ruben. 2004. Explaining explanation. Routledge.
Wojciech Samek, Thomas Wiegand, and Klaus-Robert Müller.
2017. Explainable Artificial Intelligence: Understanding, Visu-
alizing and Interpreting Deep Learning Models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1708.08296 (2017). https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.08296 [Online;
accessed 2017-09-22].
Jana Samland and Michael R. Waldmann. 2014. Do Social Norms
Influence Causal Inferences? Proceedings of the Annual Meeting
of the Cognitive Science Society 36.
Ivan Sanchez, Tim Rocktaschel, Sebastian Riedel, and Sameer Singh.
2015. Towards extracting faithful and descriptive representations
of latent variable models. AAAI Spring Syposium on Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning (KRR): Integrating Symbolic and
Neural Approaches (2015). http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/
SSS/SSS15/paper/viewFile/10304/10033 [Online; accessed 2017-
10-16].
Christian Sandvig, Kevin Hamilton, Karrie Karahalios, and Cedric
Langbort. 2014. Auditing algorithms: Research methods for de-
tecting discrimination on internet platforms. Data and discrimi-
nation: converting critical concerns into productive inquiry (2014),
1–23.
Andrew D. Selbst and Solon Barocas. 2018. The intuitive appeal of
explainable machines. (2018).
Ramprasaath R. Selvaraju, Michael Cogswell, Abhishek Das,
Ramakrishna Vedantam, Devi Parikh, and Dhruv Batra.
2016. Grad-CAM: Visual Explanations from Deep Net-
works via Gradient-based Localization. See https://arxiv.
org/abs/1610.02391 v3 (2016). https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
5582/bebed97947a41e3ddd9bd1f284b73f1648c2.pdf [Online; ac-
cessed 2017-10-16].
Avanti Shrikumar, Peyton Greenside, and Anshul Kundaje. 2017.
Learning important features through propagating activation dif-
ferences. CoRR.
Avanti Shrikumar, Peyton Greenside, and Anna Shcherbina. 2016.
Not just a black box: Learning important features through prop-
agating activation differences. CoRR.
Karen Simonyan, Andrea Vedaldi, and Andrew Zisserman. 2013.
Deep inside convolutional networks: Visualising image classifi-
cation models and saliency maps. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6034
(2013). https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6034 [Online; accessed 2017-
09-24].
Ben R. Slugoski, Mansur Lalljee, Roger Lamb, and Gerald P. Gins-
burg. 1993. Attribution in conversational context: Effect of mu-
tual knowledge on explanation–giving. European Journal of
Social Psychology 23, 3 (1993), 219–238.
Paolo Tamagnini, Josua Krause, Aritra Dasgupta, and Enrico Bertini.
2017. Interpreting Black-Box Classifiers Using Instance-Level
Visual Explanations. ACM Press, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1145/
3077257.3077260 [Online; accessed 2017-09-22].
Michael Veale and Lilian Edwards. 2018. Clarity, surprises, and
further questions in the Article 29 Working Party draft guidance
on automated decision-making and profiling. Computer Law &
Security Review 34, 2 (2018), 398–404.
SandraWachter, Brent Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell. 2018. Counter-
factual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated
Decisions and the GDPR. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
forthcoming (2018).
Douglas Walton. 2004. A new dialectical theory of explanation.
Philosophical Explorations 7, 1 (2004), 71–89.
Douglas Walton. 2007. Dialogical Models of Explanation. ExaCt
2007 (2007), 1–9.
Fulton Wang and Cynthia Rudin. 2015. Falling rule lists. Artificial
Intelligence and Statistics, 1013–1022.
Adrian Weller. 2017. Challenges for Transparency. arXiv:1708.01870
[cs] (29 7 2017). http://arxiv.org/abs/1708.01870 arXiv: 1708.01870.
Jim Woodward. 1997. Explanation, Invariance, and Intervention.
Philosophy of Science 64 (1997), S26–S41. https://www.jstor.org/
stable/188387
James Woodward and E. Zalta. 2003. Scientific explanation.
Petri Ylikoski. 2013. Causal and constitutive explanation compared.
Erkenntnis 78, 2 (2013), 277–297.
Tal Z. Zarsky. 2013. Transparent predictions. U. Ill. L. Rev. (2013),
1503.
Jiaming Zeng, Berk Ustun, and Cynthia Rudin. 2017. Interpretable
classification models for recidivism prediction. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 180, 3 (2017),
689 – 722.
